Abstract

In this paper, based on the verifiable pair and identity-based threshold cryptography, a novel identity-based (ID-based) threshold decryption scheme (IDTDS) is proposed, which is provably secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack under the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman (CBDH) problem assumption in the random oracle. The pubic checkability of ciphertext in the IDTDS is given by simply creating a signed ElGamal encryption instead of a noninteractive zero-knowledge proof. Furthermore, we introduce a modified verifiable pairing to ensure all decryption shares are consistent. Our scheme is more efficient in verification than the schemes considered previously.

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