Abstract

As Brexit removes the Nordic countries’ most powerful ally from the EU, what does this imply for their approach to European affairs? The literature on small states within the EU suggests that they can counterbalance limited bargaining capacities by entering two types of alliances: strategic partnerships with bigger member states and institutionalised cooperation on a regional basis. Against this backdrop we ask whether, by significantly raising the costs of non-cooperation for Nordic governments, the Brexit referendum has triggered a revival of Nordic political cooperation. We scrutinise this conjecture by analysing Nordic strategies of coalition-building on EU financial and budgetary policy, specifically looking at attempts to reform Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union and proposals to strengthen the EU’s fiscal powers. We find that Nordic governments have successfully collaborated on these issues in the context of new alliances such as the ‘New Hanseatic League’ or the ‘Frugal Four.’ Yet, their coalition-building strategies rely on relatively loose and issue-specific alliances rather than an institutionalisation of Nordic political cooperation, implying that this revival of Nordic political cooperation hardly involves the institutions of ‘official’ Nordic cooperation. We argue that this reflects lasting differences among the Nordics’ approach to the EU as well as electorates’ scepticism about supranational institution-building, implying that ‘reluctant Europeans’ are often also ‘reluctant Scandinavians.’

Highlights

  • The Brexit referendum of 2016 has led to much soulsearching about the future of European integration

  • What emerges from our analysis is that Brexit introduces new dynamics into European politics by changing the coalitional logics among EU member states

  • In lobbying against fiscal transfers and further integration of core state powers, different alliances to maximise Nordic influence on EU politics have come into focus

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Summary

Introduction

The Brexit referendum of 2016 has led to much soulsearching about the future of European integration. Our analysis focuses on the area of EU financial and budgetary policy with a special emphasis on reforming Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and discussions about strengthening the EU’s fiscal powers We focus on these reforms as ‘crucial cases’ for two reasons: First, recent reform initiatives in this area all seek to further strengthen the euro through the creation of additional supranational institutions and are emblematic of integration schemes observed with scepticism by both the Nordics and its now-lost ally. Actual attempts to further institutionalise official Nordic cooperation on EU policy have been blunted, as the resistance to creating a common representation in Brussels shows We argue that this mixed record of Nordic political coordination after Brexit reflects the very same mechanisms that have made the Nordic countries ‘awkward partners’ in European integration in the first place. We conclude by highlighting the implications of our analysis for the future of European integration and Nordic cooperation

Small States in European Integration
Structural Disadvantages in EU Decision-Making
The Nordic Approach as a Success Case of Small State Influence?
Nordic Cooperation and European Integration: A Difficult Relationship
Nordic Cooperation on EU Financial and Budgetary Policies After Brexit
The New Hanseatic League and EMU Reform
The ‘Frugal Four’ and Opposition to Centralising Fiscal Powers
Official Nordic Cooperation on European Affairs
Findings
Conclusion
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