Abstract
Liberal neutrality and value pluralism are both influential ideas in contemporary political theory and it might be thought that they have a natural affinity. Pluralists like Isaiah Berlin claim that the most fundamental human values are irreducibly multiple and incommensurable. From this it seems to follow that there are many legitimate ways of combining such values, hence many legitimate conceptions of the good life. And if that is true, then it seems that we are immediately heading in the direction of the view championed by John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin and others that the desirable state ought to be ‘neutral on what might be called the question of the good life’ (Dworkin, 1985: 191).
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