Neutral Monism and the Social Character of Consciousness

Abstract

mind-body problem today resembles a battle-zone in which warring camps, including physicalists, property dualists, panpsychists (Shan 2003), and emergentists (Gonzalez, Broens, and Haselager 2004) clash on a darkling plain, each side regarding others' positions as radically unacceptable. Amid this struggle, neutral monism lies as a neglected option, treated as a historical position that has somehow failed. purpose of this essay is suggest that neutral monism is indeed solution to problem, and to outline a form of that theory which avoids some of drawbacks of previous versions. Defining Physicalism In affirming neutral monism, I shall be denying physicalism, and therefore it would be good to know that denial (and affirmation) of physicalism has content. More trouble has been generated than necessary over vagueness in term physicalism. Critics have pointed out that to assert that mind can be explained in terms of present-day is a booby-trapped theory, inasmuch as historical extrapolation strongly suggests that our physical theories will eventually be discarded in favor of new theories. Therefore it has been suggested that physicalism is doctrine that consciousness will be explicable by a physics.1 But there is no reason to think that there is or ever will be such a thing as a completed We could as well say that solution to mind-body problem is whatever answer Santa will bring us this year. Yet to say more vaguely that mind will be explained in terms of some future is still an empty position, since we do not know what conceptual transformations (that is, future science that will be called physics) will undergo.2 Therefore this physicalism reduces to saying that mind will be explained in terms of something or other. We should note also a graver danger than vagueness. We can foresee possibility that mind will be explained physically by cheating; that is, that palette of fundamental ideas used in will be enlarged by addition of mental entities. That new, augmented will be able to account for mind will produce bogus appearance that some epoch-making reduction has occurred. But semantic changes wrought by future generations are not our concern. We are no more responsible for applications our grandchildren may make of term physics than Kant was for crop of occult books that currently resides beneath label Metaphysics in bookstores. Yet a perfectly coherent and meaningful theory can be formulated by humbly adopting a definition of physics from American Heritage Dictionary (3rd ed.) and defining physicalism as: The doctrine that mind can be explained in terms of science of matter and energy and of interactions between two. This is clear enough, at least if we remember to use physicists' definition of energy: the capacity for doing work, and steer clear of New Age use in which energy is a modish re-labeling of supernatural force that anthropologists call mana.3 As for matter, I stress that it is essentially an object, that is something derived from perception by abstracting away subject. proposed definition of physicalism avoids two perilous shoals. On one hand, it disentangles us from responsibility for how our descendants use word physics. On other hand, by refraining from specifying any particular physical theory, but only mapping out a kind of theory, definition does not tie us to any perishable propositions.4 Having defined physicalism, it is now possible meaningfully to deny it and seek a better alternative. Problems with Physicalism I shall not attempt a comprehensive refutation of physicalism here. My aim is different. I shall only refer to a couple of points that may be made against physicalism as a way of motivating alternative theory I wish to present. …