Abstract
This work presents a comparison between the Adam Smith’s description of sympathy in the book The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TSM) and the empathy understood as a psycho-logical phenomenon in Neuroscience. This comparison is developed in three moments: in that of the genesis of empathy, in the configuration of empathic capacity during human development and in the social and moral implications of empathy. Despite the temporary and epistemic distance of both perspectives, they have common views: the recognition of empathy as a connatural phenomenon to the human being and the modulation or deve-lopment of empathy in social interaction. These perspectives have differences related to the social and moral implications of empathy. The TSM identifies empathy as a source of morality. Neuroscience understands empathy as part of a functionalistic moral system.
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