Networks to Nowhere: Segregation and Stratification in Networks of Information about Schools

Abstract

Theory: Public sector reforms expanding citizen choice are hypothesized to create many of the benefits of private markets, in part by increasing the incentives of citizens to search for information about the quality of public services. Social scientists have shown that networks can provide valuable shortcuts to the information necessary to participate in this expanded market for public goods. Critics of public sector markets argue, however, that choice will heighten existing inequalities, increasing stratification by education and income and racial segregation. This criticism is particularly evident in debates about school choice. Hypothesis: The quality of networks in school districts with choice is hypothesized to be higher than in school districts without choice and to increase with parental education levels. Networks are also hypothesized to be segregated by race. In addition, differences in networks as a function of education and the segregation of networks by race may be greater in choice districts than in districts with no or little choice. Methods: Two stage generalized least square techniques are used to predict the quality of discussants and racial patterns in education networks while controlling for the problem of nonrandom assignment inherent in different levels of parental involvement in school choice. Results: Higher socioeconomic status individuals are more likely to have higher quality education networks. Education networks also exhibit a high degree of racial segregation. Institutional incentives do not markedly affect the nature of information networks about education-but where effects are found, they tend to indicate higher levels of class stratification and racial segregation.