Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review

Károly Takács,Adam R Kenny,Srebrenka Letina,Eleanor A Power,Jörg Gross,Martina Testori,Rafael P M Wittek

doi:10.1098/rstb.2020.0297

Abstract

Reputation has been shown to provide an informal solution to the problem of cooperation in human societies. After reviewing models that connect reputations and cooperation, we address how reputation results from information exchange embedded in a social network that changes endogenously itself. Theoretical studies highlight that network topologies have different effects on the extent of cooperation, since they can foster or hinder the flow of reputational information. Subsequently, we review models and empirical studies that intend to grasp the coevolution of reputations, cooperation and social networks. We identify open questions in the literature concerning how networks affect the accuracy of reputations, the honesty of shared information and the spread of reputational information. Certain network topologies may facilitate biased beliefs and intergroup competition or in-group identity formation that could lead to high cooperation within but conflicts between different subgroups of a network. Our review covers theoretical, experimental and field studies across various disciplines that target these questions and could explain how the dynamics of interactions and reputations help or prevent the establishment and sustainability of cooperation in small- and large-scale societies.This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

Highlights

Despite its obvious benefits, cooperation necessarily entails individual sacrifices, and so poses a fundamental puzzle for evolutionary theory, already alluded to by Darwin [1;2, pp. 5–8]
Network ties impact cooperation through multiple mechanisms. They can help the establishment of reputations that are aligned with group-beneficiary action but could potentially be used to control the flow of, or strategically manipulate, reputational information [26]
We conclude that the existing theoretical work on reputation and cooperation has not fully accounted for the possible complex interplay that emerges when social networks dynamically change as a function of gossip and reputation (e.g. [27]). While such dynamics pose many challenges, we argue that progressing the field towards investigating the interactions of reputation, gossip and network topology might help to overcome the remaining puzzles of how networks can ensure reliable reputation systems assisting the evolution of cooperation

Summary

Introduction

Cooperation necessarily entails individual sacrifices, and so poses a fundamental puzzle for evolutionary theory, already alluded to by Darwin [1;2, pp. 5–8]. Network ties impact cooperation through multiple mechanisms They can help the establishment of reputations that are aligned with group-beneficiary action but could potentially be used to control the flow of, or strategically manipulate, reputational information [26]. While such dynamics pose many challenges, we argue that progressing the field towards investigating the interactions of reputation, gossip and network topology might help to overcome the remaining puzzles of how networks can ensure reliable reputation systems assisting the evolution of cooperation Such a programme promises explanations for when and why gossip and reputation dynamics have adverse effects on cooperation, by fostering dishonesty, strategic manipulation attempts, or by giving rise to parochial, group-bounded cooperation

The problem of cooperation

Reputation as a mechanism for solving the problem of cooperation

Networks and cooperation

Reputation transmission in networks

Outlook