Network Constraint Impacts on the Competitive Electricity Markets Under Supply-Side Strategic Bidding

Abstract

In a competitive electricity market, the oligopoly structure of the market and the network constraints may produce results far from the perfect competition. This paper presents a comprehensive approach to evaluate the performances of the electricity markets with network representation in presence of bidding behavior of the producers in a pool system. A supply function strategic bidding model for the producers is introduced, and then different scenarios in terms of bidding behavior and network constraints are studied and compared on the basis of a set of microeconomic metrics. The aim of the paper is to assess, throughout a set of proper indices, the level of competition in a network-constrained market considering strategic behavior of the producers. The approach proposed gives the possibility to assess the different weight of strategic behavior of the producers and of the network constraints in distorting the market performances from its perfect competition equilibrium. From such an analysis, the worsening of the market efficiency and performances, due to the joint effects of the nonperfect competition and the network constraints, may be assessed and quantified, providing information on the adequacy of the grid considered for accommodating a competitive market. The exploitation of the proposed metrics for the market analysis is shown with reference to the IEEE 30-bus test system with demand elasticity explicitly represented.