Abstract
Braess's paradox exposes a counterintuitive phenomenon that when travelers selfishly choose their routes in a network, removing links can improve the overall network performance. Under the model of nonatomic selfish routing, we characterize the topologies of k-commodity undirected and directed networks in which Braess's paradox never occurs. Our results strengthen Milchtaich's series-parallel characterization (Milchtaich, Games Econom. Behav. 57(2), 321---346 (2006)) for the single-commodity undirected case.
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