Abstract

This paper investigates distributed algorithms for joint power allocation and user association in heterogeneous networks. We propose auction-based algorithms for offloading macrocell users ( MUs ) from the macrocell base station to privately owned small-cell access points (SCAs). We first propose a simultaneous multiple-round ascending auction (SMRA) for allocating MUs to SCAs. Taking into account the overheads incurred by SCAs during valuation in the SMRA, further improvements are proposed using techniques known as sub-optimal altered SMRA, the combinatorial auction with item bidding (CAIB), and its variations; the sequential CAIB and the repetitive CAIB. The proof for existence of the Walrasian equilibrium is demonstrated through establishing that the valuation function used by the SCAs is a gross substitute. Finally, we show that truthful bidding is individual rational for all of our proposed algorithms.

Highlights

  • As demand for data increases, the macrocell networks are becoming increasingly congested

  • The macrocell base stations (MBSs) are unable to meet the quality of services requirement of all users, certain users will have to be dropped from service

  • NUMERICAL EXAMPLE We consider a macrocell consisting of one MBS and 100 single antenna macrocell users (MUs) that are uniformly distributed within the cell

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

As demand for data increases, the macrocell networks are becoming increasingly congested. B. Basutli et al.: Network Capacity Enhancement in HetNets Using Incentivized Offloading Mechanism and Paris et al [13] formulated a combinatorial reverse auction problem wherein a set of mobile network operators (MNOs) acts as auctioneers and the wireless access points as bidders. It is the interest of MNOs to explore mechanisms that will increase their network capacity without deploying extra base stations (BSs) reducing the capital expenditure We couple these standings of both parties to create a market place environment to develop auction-based algorithms. In order to reduce the valuation overheads incurred by the bidders, we propose a second algorithm, referred to here as the altered SMRA (ASMRA). Auction coverage area: A prescribed area within which a bidder is allowed to bid

SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
SYSTEM METRIC DESIGN
BIDDERS’ VALUATION FUNCTIONS
ALLOCATION AND PAYMENT RULES
EXISTENCE OF THE WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM
SUBMODULARITY OF THE VALUATION FUNCTION
GROSS-SUBSTITUTE OF THE VALUATION FUNCTION
Result
THE SMRA AND CAIB ALGORITHMS
ALTERED SMRA ALGORITHM
Algorithm 3 steps 6 - 7 for
BIDDING STRATEGIES
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

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