Network-based multidimensional moving target defense against false data injection attack in power system

Abstract

Attackers against power grids need to collect sufficient information about the target system from accessible network communications before performing destructive activities. When the sophisticated cyberattacks like false data injection attacks (FDIA) are developed, they are typically stealthy and barely detectable for general passive defense approaches. In this paper, we propose a network-based multidimensional moving target defense (NMMTD) mechanism for power system, which focuses on disrupting the development of FDIA in the preparation stage. We extend the attack space into multiple dimensions by randomizing the data acquisition in multiple rounds. In each round, we increase apparent complexity and uncertainty in the network communications with controlled changes. To reduce the traffic burden, we design the packet random dropping policy included in NMMTD for end-to-end oblivious communications . We demonstrate the effectiveness of NMMTD in preventing the attacker from intercepting data packets and securing power system against FDIA with little impact on both the network and system performances.