Abstract

The abnormally high sex ratio at birth (SRB) is a demographic outcome that appears in several countries in Asia and Africa and results from sex-based discrimination. Whether or not neonatal discrimination was a widespread response to socioeconomic demands during the demographic transition in Europe remains an open question. To address this concern, this paper exploits the exogenous increase in the cost of child rearing caused by the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). Using random discontinuity techniques, a sharp and statistically significant increase in SRB appears with the war. This finding provides an opportunity to examine a challenging concern: whether neonatal discrimination fosters or reduces the discrimination suffered by girls in childhood. To examine the multiplier effects of discrimination, the paper investigates the potential role that women’s bargaining power could play in preventing the functioning of the transmission mechanism. To that end, the paper exploits historical geographical differences in women’s bargaining power that were inherent to the predominant kinship system in Spanish provinces (stem vs. nuclear). The results show that an increase of one standard deviation in the interaction term between gender and SRB led, on average, to a 9% points increase in under-five mortality in nuclear provinces. However, this positive relationship is not found in stem provinces, where women had greater bargaining power. The paper points out that policies aimed at creating a more egalitarian legal framework may fail if they are not accompanied by actions aimed at affecting beliefs and preferences for equality in society.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call