Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?

Abstract

This article was first published in Summer 2007 issue of Parameters. The newly issued Army/Marine counterinsurgency (COIN) manual has been met with well deserved acclaim. It is a product of our collective understanding of insurgency and ongoing experiences in Iraq. It is also product of various schools of thought about modern insurgencies, including what can be called classical school, based on concepts of Mao and revolutionary warfare. (1) In this article I will attempt to capture impact and implications of classical school on new doctrine, as well as evaluate final product. The classicists focus, perhaps myopically, on glorious heyday of revolutionary warfare in 1950s and 1960s. They embrace teachings of British expert Robert Thompson and French officer David Galula. (2) Numerous pundits have christened Galula as modern Clausewitz of COIN. (3) Not surprisingly, Thompson and Galula's concepts pervade recent Army/ Marine COIN manual, FM 3-24. Galula was a serious student of modern warfare, and following World War II spent remainder of his career exploring revolutionary wars, from China to Vietnam. (4) But one senses that he would be startled by complexity of Afghanistan and Iraq and distinctly broader global insurgency of Long War. The classicists ignore uniqueness of Maoist or colonial wars of national liberation, and over-generalize principles that have been drawn from them. Today's insurgent is not Maoist of yesterday. (5) In point of fact, there is not as much common ground among masters as classicists would have you believe. (6) The so-called classical principles are really a commonly accepted set of key principles and practices that have emerged over time. Some of classical principles are just blatant flashes of obvious, such as Robert Thompson's somber advice the government must have an overall plan. (Given our experience in Iraq, perhaps this principle is not so obvious after all). Other classical principles are not reflected in writings and teachings of masters, but have been absorbed over time. For example, emphasis on which pervades classicist's mantra. The new field manual wisely notes that legitimacy is best defined by host population. (7) The new COIN manual embraced these principles, along with an eclectic amalgamation of imperatives, paradoxes, and best practices. (8) A total of eight principles, five contemporary imperatives, ten paradoxes, and another dozen best practices are presented. (9) These various components were given great scrutiny during drafting process and reflect both classical and contemporary influences. Overall, new Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual is a substantial step forward. In particular, introductory and campaign design chapters represent fresh thinking. The chapters devoted to intelligence and training of indigenous forces are also quite useful. But manual is not without its shortcomings. The classicist's influence was a backdrop in development of manual. Early drafts were strongly criticized for emphasis placed on Mao and revolutionary warfare. A writer's conference in February of 2006, hosted by then Lieutenant General David Petraeus at Fort Leavenworth provided an opportunity for wider community to comment on initial draft. The writing team, headed by Dr. Conrad Crane, Director of Army's Military History Institute, assessed inputs from a wide-range of experts, Iraq veterans, and international participants. The new doctrine's principal theme, a thread that cutting across modern insurgency is appropriate requirement to learn and adapt.'' (10) This theme is ironic given reaction that manual received from outside experts. The manual's Foreword observes, You cannot fight former Saddamists and Islamic extremists same way you would have fought Viet Cong, Moros, or Tupamaros. …