NEMESIS: Keeping Russia an Enemy through Cold War Pathologies

Matthew Crosston

doi:10.18611/2221-3279-2015-6-3(20)-21-33

Abstract

This article examines the openly adversarial neoconservative foundation under George Bush to the supposedly more ‘engaged’diplomatic interaction under Barack Obama. What will be exposed is a fairly uninspired and non-innovative American policy that not only fails to consider Russian initiatives from Russia’s own national security perspectives, but aims to contain it within a continued Cold War box that not only sours opportunities for collaboration but guarantees the absence of partnership in areas of global security. This piece examines the consequences of imagining Russia only as nemesis.

Highlights

There have been numerous articles on the authoritarian strengthening of power in Russia and Putin’s backsliding from democracy throughout the 2000’s
Russian positions and initiatives in Syria and Ukraine have been portrayed within media venues across the West as evidence of quasi-Soviet revanchism
The idea that Russia’s contemporary positions have not evolved beyond the residue of Cold War mentalities seems to be more a product of scholars and practitioners in the West rather than in the institutions of Russia itself. This piece examines the consequences of imagining Russia only as nemesis and whether the West is more responsible for this Cold War pathology than it is willing to admit

Summary

Introduction

There have been numerous articles on the authoritarian strengthening of power in Russia and Putin’s backsliding from democracy throughout the 2000’s. What will be exposed is a fairly uninspired and non-innovative American policy that fails to consider Russian initiatives from Russia’s own national security interests, but aims to contain Russia within a continued Cold War box that sours opportunities for collaboration but guarantees the absence of partnership in important global security areas.

Results

Conclusion