Abstract

A widely shared assumption in the literature about skilled motor behavior is that any action that is not blindly automatic and mechanical must be the product of computational processes upon mental representations. To counter this assumption, in this paper we offer a radical embodied (non-representational) account of skilled action that combines ecological psychology and the Deweyan theory of habits. According to our proposal, skilful performance can be understood as composed of sequences of mutually coherent, task-specific perceptual-motor habits. Such habits play a crucial role in simplifying both our exploration of the perceptual environment and our decision-making. However, we argue that what keeps habits situated, precluding them from becoming rote and automatic, are not mental representations but the agent's conscious attention to the affordances of the environment. It is because the agent is not acting on autopilot but constantly searching for new information for affordances that she can control her behavior, adapting previously learned habits to the current circumstances. We defend that our account provides the resources needed to understand how skilled action can be intelligent (flexible, adaptive, context-sensitive) without having any representational cognitive processes built into them.

Highlights

  • A mark of intelligent, skilled action is adaptive flexibility

  • As Sutton et al (2011) note, as soon as we reflect upon the fast-changing dynamics of the circumstances where athletes perform, we find the idea that skilled action involves the application of explicit, propositionally articulated deliberation hard to believe

  • We argue that the empirical evidence gathered by ecological psychologists shows that intelligent, skilled action is possible on the basis of direct perception, and that complex behavioral solutions that seem to require mental representations can be simplified by capitalizing on affordance-specific perceptual information

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Summary

Introduction

A mark of intelligent, skilled action is adaptive flexibility. In order to achieve their goals, expert agents—e.g., athletes—must be able to control their actions, responding in an appropriate manner to the demands and contingencies of the situation. Even if we can agree that there is probably no time for conscious planning and deliberation in situations that require rapid and coordinated responses, it is not clear how an action can be mindlessly automatic and intelligent at the same time In other words, it is not clear how an agent can exert control over her actions, adjusting it in a flexible, context-sensitive way if she is performing with little or no attention to what she is doing. A series of authors (see Bermúdez, 2017; Christensen et al, 2016; Fridland, 2014, 2017a; Pacherie & Mylopoulos, 2020) have tried to articulate accounts of skilled motor behavior that avoid both over-intellectualizing and under-intellectualizing it According to these middle-ground views, skilled actions are neither mindful (based on conscious reflection) nor mindless (purely reactive and automatic), but minded, meaning that the skilled performer has some form of cognitive control over them.

The automaticity principle
On representational theories of expertise
Skilled action without representations
An ecological approach to skilled action
Perceptual learning for skilled action
Considering different objections
The importance of habits for an ecological theory of skilled motor behavior
Conclusion
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