Abstract
The literature showing that territorial residents generally respond more intensely to an intrusion by a stranger than by a known neighbour is reviewed. The functional basis of this discrimination has not been seriously considered in this extensive literature, and it is shown here how the asymmetric war of attrition can explain why neighbours settle with relatively little aggression. In the asymmetric war-of-attrition model the degree of escalation observed in a territorial contest depends on the familiarity of the contestants with each other. Predictions of this model about neighbour-stranger contests are supported by data in the literature.
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