Abstract

When do negotiators say „no” and refuse to reach peace agreements in armed conflicts, even if it may lead to a ceasefire? Empirical studies have predominantly focused on factors and techniques that facilitate the start of peace negotiations. Little is known about the reasons that motivate conflict parties to refuse to negotiate. This article offers a novel framework for analysis that explains how to avoid impracticable peace agreements. Using the case of the Minsk agreements, the article shows at least two ways: avoiding the agreement trap and negotiation impasse tactics. The Minsk agreements are a case in which a negotiated settlement is defined as a policy goal (agreement trap). The Minsk process is an example of a negotiating impasse created to avoid implementing a peace agreement disadvantageous to Ukraine.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call