Negotiation framework for Baltic fisheries management: striking the balance of interest

Abstract

Abstract Aps, R., Kell, L.T., Lassen, H., and Liiv, I. 2007. Negotiation framework for Baltic fisheries management: striking the balance of interest. – ICES Journal of Marine Science, 64: 858–861. We explore the issue of balancing stakeholder interests in the translation of science-based advice into agreed management measures. We also analyse the outcome of negotiations within the International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission (IBSFC) for setting the total allowable catch (TAC) for Baltic herring, sprat, cod, and salmon between 1977 and 2004. Given the political and economic pressure inherent in fishery management, IBSFC Contracting Parties, as maximizers of economic value, often set the TAC by unit stock in excess of what was considered sustainable. TACs set in excess of sustainable levels of exploitation (decision-overfishing) reflect the relative importance that negotiating parties attribute to the interests of multiple groups participating in the fishing industry. Such decision-overfishing can be seen as management failure to secure public interest in the long-term health of fish populations. The potential political and social causes of overfishing have to be addressed and removed before measures can be implemented that might reach the goal of sustainable development.