Negotiation behavior and outcomes: Empirical evidence and theoretical issues.

Abstract

This article examines the ability of the individual differences, motivational, and cognitive approaches of negotiation to account for empirical research on dyadic negotiation. Investigators have typically focused on objective, economic measures of performance. However, social-psychological measures are important because negotiators often do not have the information necessary to make accurate judgments of the bargaining situation. Negotiators' judgments are biased, and biases are associated with inefficient performance. Personality and individual differences appear to play a minimal role in determining bargaining behavior; their impact may be dampened by several factors, such as homogeneity of subject samples, situational constraints, and self-selection processes. Motivational and cognitive models provide compelling accounts of negotiation behavior. A psychological theory of negotiation should begin at the level of the individual negotiator and should integrate features of motivational and cognitive models. Negotiation is a pervasive and important form of social interaction. Negotiation is necessary whenever conflict erupts and there are no fixed or established rules or procedures to resolve conflict and whenever people want to search for agreement without resorting to aggression or open fighting (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985). Negotiation occurs in business and academic environments and in informal social interactions such as deciding with a friend or spouse where to dine or vacation. Clearly, negotiation is essential for anyone who must interact with other people to accomplish their objectives. There is broad interest in the study of negotiation behavior. This interest is evident in the interdisciplinary history of the study of negotiation in the fields of psychology, economics, industrial relations, organization behavior, sociology, and law. The theoretical goal is to predict the processes and outcomes of negotiation. The practical or applied goal is to help people negotiate more effectively (Bazerman, 1986; Raiffa, 1982). The fundamental and enduring questions raised by the growing body of research on negotiation behavior include the following: What factors lead to negotiation success or failure? Which theoretical perspective provides the best account of negotiation behavior? What empirical findings must a theoretical approach to negotiation explain? The purpose of this article is to address these theoretical and empirical issues. A variety of theoretical analyses of negotiation behavior have been developed. An important theoretical distinction is that between normative and descriptive approaches (Neale & Northcraft, in press; Raiffa, 1982). Normative models are based on axioms of individual rationality (cf. von Neumann &