Abstract
We develop a sequential game representing bargaining between a public university and a professor over a vacant administrative position, such as an academic deanship. We find that the administrative salary is an increasing function of the job candidate's salary, the prior dean's salary, the price of undergraduate courses, elasticity of the wage differential, and faculty productivity. The game also indicates that if the new dean is female or minority, and if the previous dean's salary is important, then one can conclude that the professor is able to circumvent wage discrimination given that the salaries of public university officials are publicly available.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
