Negotiating with the LDCs: Situation and Context

Abstract

In this article I introduce and analyze some characteristic features of bilateral foreign aid negotiations, as compared to other types of negotiations between states. A first typical trait is the apparent asymmetry of power between the negotiating actors. According to bargaining theory, this would predict also an asymmetry of outcome. Such a conclusion is challenged, however, by other distinguishing features of aid negotiations. The normative aspect, stating the existence of moral obligations, the repetitive nature of most aid negotiations, the existence of asymmetries of attention and resolve, and some tactical characteristics of such negotiations: all these aspects might be interpreted as creating more promising conditions for the weaker actor. To understand and explain foreign aid negotiations — their processes and outcomes — it is not enough, however, to study the negotiatory situation as such. An analysis of extra-negotiatory contextual factors is also needed. I distinguish between three categories: relations between the actors outside of the aid negotiations, relations between the actors and other actors, and the domestic contexts of both actors.