Abstract
We have collected data from a world-wide survey among COP delegates to empirically investigate preferences for certain burden sharing rules among key groups in a setting that reflects the possibility of observing concessions from negotiating partners. In our survey, the participants had the opportunity to select and combine up to eight (pre-defined) burden sharing rules and to assign relative weights to the selected rules in their preferred bundle. We examine whether such a mechanism helps to overcome the currently strictly (self-interested) strategic claims on equity in the negotiation process. We observe that delegates from different groups of countries show a general willingness for concessions. However, the degree to which different burden sharing rules are taken into consideration partly differs between countries. As a key insight we report that the individual assessment of the polluter-pays rule based on current emissions does not only stress the persistence of the traditional Annex-B/Non-Annex-B division but also suggests tendencies for a more fragmented grouping with different positions between, for example, delegates from developing countries (i.e. G77 members) and emerging countries (i.e. BASIC). At the same time, we observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among key groups towards the ability-to-pay rule in a setting of weighted burden sharing rules.
Highlights
The adoption of the first-ever global climate deal at COP-21, the Paris Agreement, in December 2015 (UNFCCC 2015) was achieved through a fundamental change in the climate policy architecture: Instead of trying to impose âtop-downâ targets for every country, the Paris Agreement builds on âbottom-upâ nationally determined and sovereign commitments being voluntary and not enforceable
While the current formulation of the stocktake principally does not preclude an assessment on an individual country level, the discussions during the Paris Agreement clearly stressed that, collectively, parties at that time were not willing to agree upon a process that explicitly targets the role of individual assessments in this process but postponed the debate (e.g., Holz and Ngwadla 2016)
We observe that delegates from different groups of countries show a general willingness for concessions
Summary
The adoption of the first-ever global climate deal at COP-21, the Paris Agreement, in December 2015 (UNFCCC 2015) was achieved through a fundamental change in the climate policy architecture: Instead of trying to impose âtop-downâ targets for every country, the Paris Agreement builds on âbottom-upâ nationally determined and sovereign commitments being voluntary and not enforceable. Our analysis can be considered as a first attempt to assess preferences for weighted or âstaged approachesâ (e.g., Höhne et al 2014), where countries take differentiated commitments in various dimensions To address this challenge, in this paper we empirically investigate preferences for certain burden sharing rules among key groups in a setting that addresses the need for relative assessments of certain rules and reflects on a possibility of observing concessions from negotiating partners. As a key insight we report that, in line with previous studies, the individual assessment of the polluter-pays rule based on current emissions does stress the persistence of the traditional Annex-B/Non-Annex-B division but in addition suggests tendencies for a more fragmented grouping with different positions between, for example, delegates from developing countries (i.e. G77 members) and emerging countries (i.e. BASIC). We observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among key groups towards the ability-to-pay rule
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
