Abstract

Institutions need to ignore some knowledge in order to function. This is “uncomfortable knowledge” because it undermines the ability of those institutions to pursue their goals (Rayner, 2012). We identify three bodies of knowledge that are relevant to understandings of the dual use threat posed by synthetic biology but are excluded from related policy discussions. We demonstrate how these “unknown knowns” constitute uncomfortable knowledge because they disrupt the simplified worldview that underpins contemporary discourse on the potential misuse of synthetic biology by malign actors. We describe how these inconvenient truths have been systematically ignored and argue that this is because they are perceived as a threat by organisations involved in the promotion of synthetic biology as well as by those involved in managing biosecurity risks. This has led to a situation where concerns about the biosecurity threat posed by synthetic biology are not only exaggerated, but are, more importantly, misplaced. This, in turn, means that related policies are misdirected and unlikely to have much impact. We focus on the dynamics of discussions about synthetic biology and dual use to demonstrate how the same “knowns” that are denied or dismissed as “unknown knowns” in certain circumstances are sometimes mobilised as “known knowns” by the same category of actors in a different context, when this serves to sustain the goals of the individuals and institutions involved. Based on our own experience, we argue that negotiating the dynamics of uncomfortable knowledge is a difficult, but necessary, component of meaningful transdisciplinary collaborations.

Highlights

  • Synthetic biology is commonly portrayed as a “dual use” field of science that increases the risk of attacks using bioweapons, especially from terrorists operating outside state organisations

  • Negotiating the dynamics of uncomfortable knowledge biology but have been excluded from policy discussions. We describe how these “inconvenient truths” have been systematically ignored and argue that this is because they are perceived, by organisations involved in the promotion of synthetic biology as well as by those involved in managing biosecurity risks, as a threat to their ability to pursue their goals and justify their existence

  • We identified three bodies of knowledge from the field of STS that are relevant to understandings of the dual use threat posed by synthetic biology and showed how they have been systematically ignored by institutions involved in the promotion of synthetic biology as well as by those involved in managing biosecurity risks

Read more

Summary

Introduction

Synthetic biology is commonly portrayed as a “dual use” field of science that increases the risk of attacks using bioweapons, especially from terrorists operating outside state organisations. Negotiating the dynamics of uncomfortable knowledge biology but have been excluded from policy discussions We describe how these “inconvenient truths” have been systematically ignored and argue that this is because they are perceived, by organisations involved in the promotion of synthetic biology as well as by those involved in managing biosecurity risks, as a threat to their ability to pursue their goals and justify their existence. We focus on the dynamics of discussions about synthetic biology and dual use and describe situations where the same knowns that are denied or dismissed as unknown knowns in certain circumstances are mobilised as known knowns by the same category of actors in a different context This analysis reveals how, in some circumstances, key concepts such as “tacit knowledge”, “de-skilling” and “engineering” are re-interpreted in order to sustain the goals of the biosecurity and synthetic biology institutions involved

Methods
Findings
Discussion
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call