Negotiating Peace with Your Enemy: The Problem of Costly Concessions

Valerie Sticher

doi:10.1093/jogss/ogaa054

Abstract

Abstract Why do some parties fail to settle conflict, even after long periods of fighting? Bargaining theory explains this through imperfect information, commitment problems, war entrepreneurs, and indivisible stakes. Integrating insights from social psychology into bargaining theory, this article proposes an additional bargaining obstacle. Conflict party members not only care about their in-group's welfare, but also want to avoid rewarding their opponent through concessions. A mutually acceptable agreement always contains concessions, yet when concessions are unpopular with key constituents, they are costly for leaders to make. This may result in a situation where leaders would prefer to settle but still decide to continue the war. Modifying a standard bargaining setup to account for this dilemma, the article demonstrates the difficulties of settling a conflict when out-group preferences are salient. It shows how events that increase the saliency of out-group preferences, such as major ceasefire violations, lead to a drop in public support for negotiations. The problem of costly concessions renders the search for a mutually acceptable agreement a delicate balancing act, particularly if constituents are isolated from the costs of war and political competitors mobilize around unpopular concessions.

Highlights

The Colombian government had engaged in talks with the FARC under various administrations, including major initiatives in the early 1980s, the early 1990s and around the turn of the century, to seek to end the armed conflict with the largest guerilla group in the country
The problem of costly concessions renders the search for a mutually acceptable agreement a delicate balancing act, if constituents are isolated from the costs of war and political competitors mobilize around unpopular concessions
The analysis shows how for conflict party leaders, negotiated conflict settlement is politically unfeasible if key constituents have strong hatred for the opponent and are largely isolated from the costs of war

Summary

Introduction

The Colombian government had engaged in talks with the FARC under various administrations, including major initiatives in the early 1980s, the early 1990s and around the turn of the century, to seek to end the armed conflict with the largest guerilla group in the country. His administration started informal and secret talks with the FARC, followed by more formal explorative talks. The public phase of the negotiations lasted four years, with the parties reaching a peace deal in August 2016. Congress ratified a revised version of the deal at the end of November 2016, paving the way for an end to the half-century long-armed guerilla conflict

Objectives

Conclusion