Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper challenges previous institutional analyses of conflict patterns, showing that land conflicts are more complex and unpredictable than generally assumed. It documents how the arrival of investors in a Tanzanian village has fostered local land conflicts, and explains why local leaders defended their fellow villagers in one land conflict, but discriminated against them in another. Using a local political settlement approach, I argue that studying how formal and informal institutions are structuring the distribution of power is key to explaining why local leaders have used different conflict management strategies. This paper contributes to an emerging scholarship that links the global land rush and land conflicts, insisting on the role played by Tanzanian investors. It also nuances the dominant narrative of Tanzania as a harmonious country in which ethnicity is not politically salient by showing that local actors may instrumentalize identity to produce political discrimination.

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