Abstract
Abstract Adapting well-established organization theories to international joint ventures (IJVs), this paper develops an overarching theoretical model of the determinants and effects of parent control of IJVs from an interpartner bargaining power perspective. Drawing upon power dependence, transaction costs, and agency theories, we argue that the relative bargaining power between IJV partners serves as the key determinant of control structure, and that control exerts a direct effect on the venture's performance. In addition, government influence and interpartner working relationship are critical factors that complicate the linkage between control and performance but may help to explain past conflicting results. Propositions regarding these relationships are formed for future empirical test, and implications and directions for future research are provided.
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