Negotiating a River: Canada, the US, and the Creation of the St. Lawrence Seaway, by Daniel Macfarlane

Abstract

Reviewed by: Ronald Stagg, Ryerson UniversitySurely one of the longest negotiations between Canada and the United States must be that involving navigation of the Great Lakes, and in particular the St. Lawrence River. Beginning in the 1890s, both the Canadian Parliament and American House of Representatives requested improved navigation on the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence route. Negotiations dragged on for over half a century, with each country taking turns being the reluctant partner. Only twice in the intervening years was an agreement close, in 1932 when a change of government in the United States doomed a signed agreement, and in 1941 when the entry of the United States into the Second World War frustrated President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's attempt to carry a measure through Congress.Previous works on the history of the Seaway, from Carleton Mabee's 1961 The Seaway Story to this reviewer's 2010 volume, The Golden Dream: A History of the St. Lawrence Seaway, have covered these negotiations in great detail, with each addressing somewhat different material. Macfarlane has chosen a different approach, summarizing these protracted negotiations in two short but effective chapters and then concentrating on the few years leading up to the signing of the treaty in 1954. To this he has added his take on the building of the St. Lawrence canals and power project, in what could be termed a technological and environmental history, and some comments on the operation of the canal since its completion.Macfarlane's distinctive contribution to the history of negotiations is his in-depth look at the position of the Canadian government on building an all-Canadian system. There has been speculation about whether the Canadian government became frustrated with the time it took the American government to approve the plan and decided to go it alone, or was bluffing to put pressure on the Americans. Macfarlane makes a strong case for the former. By 1952, the Canadian government informed President Harry Truman that, given the difficulties the Truman administration was having in getting approval for a revamped 1941 agreement, Canada was prepared to go it alone in building a new canal system in the St. Lawrence, with strong support from the Canadian public. This much was already public knowledge. The author goes on to explain that, until the American Federal Power Commission approved New York State as the entity responsible for developing the American half of the power project, and all appeals of the decision were exhausted, Canada could not act, even though the power project was considered vital to the future growth of Ontario. By the time this occurred in early 1954 both branches of Congress were discussing new schemes for a joint development, so the Canadian Cabinet decided to wait rather than pursue the all-Canadian plan and possibly offend the Americans. This suggests that there had never been a firm determination in Cabinet for Canada to act alone, but Macfarlane sees the decision as the abandonment of an all-Canadian policy in order to maintain good relations with Canada's wartime ally and trading partner, a point he elaborates upon in his conclusion. …