Abstract

**Read paper on the following link:** https://ifaamas.org/Proceedings/aamas2022/pdfs/p472.pdf **Abstract:** As autonomous systems are deployed at a large scale in both public and private spaces, robots owned and operated by competing organisations will be required to interact. Interactions in such settings will be inherently non-cooperative. We therefore address the problem of non-cooperative multi-agent path finding. We design an auction mechanism that allows a group of agents to reach their goals whilst minimising the total cost of the system, in such a way that rational agents are incentivised to participate. Our Privileged Knowledge Auction (PKA) consists of a modified combinatorial Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction. Our approach restricts the initial number of bids in the VCG auction, then uses the privileged knowledge of the auctioneer to identify and solve path conflicts, whilst maintaining the autonomy of individual agents. The mechanism provides a heuristic method to maximise social welfare whilst remaining computationally efficient. We also propose an algorithm which allows individual agents to generate unique and diverse bids, which increases the success likelihood of both the restricted bid VCG auction and our novel approach on synthetic data. Our results on synthetic data outperform existing work on this problem.

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