Negativism as an effective methodology in linguistic description

Abstract

This chapter reviews the philosophico-methodological foundations underlying the descriptive linguistic approach called Axiomatic Functionalism (AF). AF is a paradigm in Kuhn's sense (Kuhn, 1962). It includes a theory together with a directly theory-related methodology, a general methodology, which is a very adapted version of Karl Popper's falsificationism and a sustained program of linguistic description. The latter is geared toward providing test cases for the adequacy of the theory. The AF version of falsificationism differs in two important respects from other versions; one being that a strict, in fact ontological, distinction is maintained between theory and description, and the second being the practice referred to as negativism. In all attempts at falsification, that is, attempted refutation of a hypothesis, the definitions of the theory are intimately involved. The formulation of the hypotheses is conceived of as an intermediate stage between the theory and a particular linguistic description, and no hypothesis is permitted that is either not completely relevant and meaningful under the theory, or vitiated by terms that are not defined within the theory. All theories of knowledge and most other philosophical pursuits are of necessity speculative. Speculation, by using arguments based on plausibility, contributes in a significant way to understanding and knowledge, albeit never exact knowledge.