Negative Platonism and the Appearance-Problem

Abstract

Patocka’s concept of the phenomenology of the natural world always has two aspects: first, it is strictly related to the threefold existential movement of human be-ing in the world, it has, in other words, ethical and existential relevance; second, neither can the phenomenology of the natural world be separated from the concept of phenomenon. After presenting these two subjects, I attempt to show that the problem of freedom and that of appearing are not totally separate, but have a very important meeting point: negative Platonism. Among Patocka’s other relevant philosophical insights, this seems to be one of the most fruitful, though at the same time one of the less discussed ideas. The concept of negative Platonism not only shows the way towards an ethics without metaphysics, but also opens up a new approach to the phenomenon without ideal-eidetic structure. Arguments attesting to the fact that these two aspects are strictly interrelated and mutually dependent can also be found in Patocka’s late manuscripts (Vom Erscheinen als solchem. Texte aus dem Nachlas). In the last part of my presentation, I propose to explore the connections between Patocka’s negative Platonism and a central problem of every transcendental philosophy from Kant to Husserl: that of schematism. I suppose that the concept of negative Platonism can be considered as a new answer to the classical question: how intuitive contents meet conceptual form. The originality of Patocka’s solution consists in attempting to answer this question in a non-epistemological way.