Abstract
We examined how wage claims impact the principal–agent relationship between firms and workers with hidden action using laboratory experiments on a gift exchange game in which workers made payoff-irrelevant requests concerning their wage before the firm made a wage offer. We compared the experimental results of this game to those of a gift exchange game without wage claims and found that the wage claim detracted reciprocity regardless of the wage levels offered by the firm, resulting in shrinking economic surplus in their labor contracts. JEL Classification: C92, J3, J42
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