Needs and Rights not needs versus rights: expanding Hamilton's conception of politics to include negative rights

Abstract

Hamilton's argument for a political philosophy of needs moves from a critique of rights, more specifically the 'rights-preferences couple', as inappropriate foundation for liberal political theory and practice. While acknowledging some role for rights in a needs-based polity, Hamilton says nothing about what this role might be, and follows Geuss in criticising rights as neither philosophically special nor politically useful. This conclusion would be problematic, for certain rights, Marshall's 'rights from the state' or negative rights, are consistent with the 'state of needs' that Hamilton identifies. Moreover, rights from the s'tate' are better suited than needs to address the problem of oppressive state authority precisely because of their deontological character and legal institutionalisation. Today most politics in liberal democracies is less about conflict and more about co-operation between state and citizen, and so perhaps Hamilton is right to emphasise needs over rights, but there is still a role for a negative rights when conflict emerges. Indeed, negative rights together with needs could constitute a conceptual couple well suited to realising freedom and equality under liberal-democratic conditions.