Need metaphoric comprehension take longer than literal comprehension?

Abstract

To determine if metaphoric comprehension necessarily depends upon a more complex process than literal comprehension, 120 subjects in six different experiments were asked to code a series of sentences into one of the following logical sentence categories: analytic, synthetic, contradictory, anomalous, and metaphoric. Prior to this task, all subjects were given practice in learning to code examples of each of the various categories. Results of the present set of experiments revealed few systematic differences among the various categories in RT and a high degree of consistency in coding patterns across both the learning and RT phases of the experiments. Although procedural variations introduced for purposes of control produced clear and easily understandable changes in RT, coding patterns were essentially unchanged across the various experiments, suggesting that none of the categories could be considered as logically more basic than any other. The results were discussed in terms of contemporary semantic theory, where it was suggested that metaphoric recognition need not be conceptualized as depending on a more inferential level of semantic processing than literal recognition and that future theories must be more context-sensitive than those currently in fashion.