Abstract
Goodpaster asks: “[I]s the concept of moral responsibility, as we are pursuing it, a normative concept or a descriptive concept or a mixture of the two?” (1983: 5). The way I see it the attribution of moral responsibility is a description about what a moral agent has done (or should have done). However, what is required to be a moral agent is normatively decided by us given an understanding of the central abilities that we think the metaphysics of moral agency requires. In other words the attribution of moral responsibility to an agent is an event-description founded on a normative conception of what it should mean to be morally responsible. And what it should mean to be morally responsible involves a thorough understanding of the abilities for moral agency and their moral relevance.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
