Abstract

While the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-dictatorial and resolute, i.e., single-valued, social choice function is manipulable, it was recently shown that a number of appealing irresolute Condorcet extensions are strategyproof according to Kelly's preference extension. In this paper, we study whether these results carry over to stronger preference extensions due to Fishburn and Gardenfors. For both preference extensions, we provide sufficient conditions for strategyproofness and identify social choice functions that satisfy these conditions, answering a question by Gardenfors [15] in the affirmative. We also show that some more discriminatory social choice functions fail to satisfy necessary conditions for strategyproofness.

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