Nazi Germany and the Future of Europe: George Kennan's Views, 1939–1945

Abstract

George kennan despaired in the late 1930s over what he viewed as the deplorable condition of US politics and diplomacy. By the summer of 1938, while heading the Russian desk at the state department, he was tempted to resign from the foreign service and to pursue in Wisconsin, like previous generations of Kennans, a life in farming or some other 'small job'.1 However, he chose not to seek retirement, but to accept instead the government's next assignment: to serve as consul in Prague. The Czechoslovak crisis had been simmering throughout that summer, and Kennan could not resist the chance of playing a role in it, however small. 'The near future was clearly going to bring the answer to many questions. After watching the storm brew for ten years, I did not want to miss the climax.'2 He arrived in the beautiful baroque Czech capital at exactly the time when Chamberlain, Daladier, and Hitler reached agreement on Czechoslovakia's fate in Munich. During the six years of war that followed, Kennan served not only in Prague but in other European posts that provided him with broad exposure to the conflict in its political and diplomatic dimensions. The first issue that dominated his thinking during his tenure in Prague and Berlin, had to do with the nature of Nazi-German politics and Hitler's organization of economy and empire. After US entry into the war, while serving in London as counsellor on the US delegation to the European Advisory Commission, Kennan was principally concerned with the conduct of hostilities and planning for post-war Europe. This led him to consider seriously the prospects for Soviet-US relations after Germany's defeat.3