Abstract

ABSTRACT This article hypothesises the intricate role of the elite within a consociational political framework characterised by a rentier economy. It posits that the societal interest is perennially sidelined due to the sectarian and ethnic delineations inherent in the representation of sub-identities. The competition among the elite to secure control over the state’s financial resources, predominantly derived from natural reserves, further exacerbates this neglect, engendering a myopic focus on narrow interests. The chosen case study, Iraq, stands out as a noteworthy exemplar of a consociational political system concomitantly characterised by a rentier economy. Within this milieu, the political elite, despite a protracted period of lacklustre performance spanning nearly two decades, exhibits remarkable resilience and an augmentation of its authoritative stature.

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