Naïve Realism in Philosophy of Literature

Abstract

The journal Philosophy and Literature is one of leading locations for contemporary discussions of relations between philosophy and literature. Recently journal came out with its 20th Anniversary Issue, a copy of which I received because I had written a book review for issue. For fun of it I decided to read issue from front to back. I was struck by how many of articles were committed to some form of what has traditionally been called realism.1 Much is said positively about science and scientific method, whereas schools of thought that have often criticized realism, for example post-structuralism and Rortyan pragmatism, come under frequent attack. This is not surprising, given that editorial, by Dennis Dutton and Patrick Henry, focuses on Alan Sokal's explanation of his now famous hoax against well-known cultural studies journal Social Text.2 While reading issue it occurred to me that journals are units of cultural production, and that they should be as open to discussion and critique as anything else. Although it would be difficult to read entire production of a journal, a special anniversary issue would surely represent general point of view of editors and contributors.3 Someone might object to criticism of one journal appearing in another, for example in Philosophy Today. It is my view that writing a critique of this sort is not fundamentally different from writing a review of an edited collection of essays. It should also be stressed that I have no intention to denigrate work of editors of Philosophy of Literature, which I consider to be a fine publication. My only desire is to open up new avenues of discussion for issues raised in that journal.4 My general claim then is that anniversary issue of Philosophy and Literature, taken as a whole, is a defense of against various opponents of that position. (I shall call this defense of the new realism.) We certainly need some sort of corrective against recent excesses of postmodern literary theory and philosophy. But pendulum swings have a way of overcorrecting. Nothing is being said by any of authors found in this issue about limits or possible disadvantages of realism, or of metaphysical assumptions behind that position. Part of reason why these assumptions are not addressed is that awfulness of opposition seems so glaring. The new realists frequently and gleefully point to inscrutable jargon, inconsistencies and bad arguments of their opponents. (Editor, Dennis Dutton, runs a well-known annual Bad Writing Contest for ugliest, most stylistically awful single sentence-or string of no more than three sentences-found in a published scholarly book or article.5 Some of winners are simply stunning.) This may lead them to believe that a combination of clarity, logic and scientific method will save literary studies and philosophy from barbarians. These concerns are certainly legitimate, and nothing I will say here is intended to justify poststructuralist outrages. I would simply like us to engage in a bit of hopefully jargon-free and clear-headed questioning about new itself. First, a comment about term Most people would consider themselves realists in some sense. I certainly do. Those who, like myself, are opposed to, or at least critical of version of found in these pages tend to refer to it as naive realism. The true realism, on our account, is not naive. Naive is not truly realist, not realistic enough. It was a sad mistake for critics of to have called themselves anti-realists, since this allowed term realism to remain in hands of their opponents. The most fundamental assumption of is existence, stability, independence and ideal determinability of facts. The realist would not go so far as to say, with Wittgenstein, that world is all that is case. …