Abstract
This article argues that French naval policy‐makers were slow to adjust to the changed strategic landscape of the 1930s. During the 1920s France did not face a serious land or air threat. Defence policy‐makers were therefore able to devote a large portion of the defence budget to rebuilding French maritime power. But when the Depression and the rise of Nazi Germany overturned the strategic situation in Europe, policy‐makers adjusted by giving priority to land and air rearmament and by placing ever greater emphasis on securing an alliance with Great Britain. The French naval establishment resisted this trend unsuccessfully. The frustration of naval planning increased the resentment and mistrust of both the Third Republic and Great Britain that characterised naval attitudes before and particularly during the Second World War.
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