Abstract

Methods. The theoretical and methodological basis of the study is the theory of sectoral markets as a separate branch of microeconomic theory that explains the principles of functioning of market structures. Starting from the neoclassical concept of monopoly and supplementing it with institutional, behavioral and other parameters, the author conducts a comparative analysis of economic and natural monopoly with a new phenomenon in market organization – the monopoly of information and communication platforms, and on this basis determines the its nature. Results. The article theoretically substantiates the sources of monopoly of information and communication platforms, including the high level of market concentration, low elasticity of demand, and barriers to entry that are typical for traditional economic monopolies, and the economies of scale, subadditivity of costs and control over the key resource in the industry that are inherent in natural monopolies, as well as network effects, transaction cost savings and control over large databases that are unique to the monopoly of information and communication platforms. The author describes the typical behavioral strategies that follow from them: the formation of «bottlenecks» in the channels of goods movement and the exploitation of the lock-in effect, vertical integration and leverage of market power, personalization, exclusive dealership, etc. The specifics of their implementation for transactional and non-transactional platforms are determined. The role of the key resource operator in the digital ecosystem is determined. Novelty of the study presented in the article lies in the systematization of the sources of market power that determine the formation of the monopoly of information and communication platforms, and in the identification of unique ones among them and those which are typical for other types of monopoly. The author substantiates the role of network effects, transaction costs and big data control in consolidating the monopoly position of information and communication platforms in the «bottlenecks» of the commodity circulation chains. Practical value. The results of the study form the theoretical basis for the state regulation of the monopoly of information and communication platforms.

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