Nature and post‐conflict violence: water management under the Communist Party of Kampuchea, 1975–1979

Abstract

Between 1975 and 1979 approximately two million people died in Cambodia. Whereas most literature has focused on the ‘direct’ killing associated with torture and execution, we focus on the structures of violence that contributed to the death of men, women and children through famine‐related causes. Accordingly, this paper sits at the intersection of three bodies of literature: water management policies, post‐conflict reconstruction and political violence. Through a case study of Democratic Kampuchea, we first add to contemporary research that has destabilised the dichotomy between ‘conflict’ and ‘post‐conflict’, by showing how post‐conflict societies are not necessarily free from violence: indeed post‐conflict policies of state rebuilding may establish structures that engender widespread violence. Second, we provide a variation on ‘environmental violence’. In contrast to previous literature, we consider how environmental management policies contribute to violence in a post‐conflict setting rather than focus on environmental degradation following conflict. Third, and more narrowly, we provide a transformative understanding of the Cambodian ‘genocide’. Together, we argue that Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) water management was a key component of a larger post‐conflict reconstruction effort of Democratic Kampuchea's leadership. Agricultural surplus production was essential, but the CPK understood that increases in agricultural productivity were impossible without a systematic water management strategy. The imposition of post‐conflict policies would manifest in the death of millions, but not because CPK policies were unplanned or unorganised. Rather, the remarkable death toll that ensued was just the opposite; it was the result of a highly organised attempt to reconstruct Cambodia.