Naturalness and Deformation in Hegel's Inorganic Philosophy of Nature

Abstract

This article discusses Hegel's claim that nature is the idea (Idee) having become external (äußerlich) to itself. Usually taken to signal a type of limitation in Hegel's philosophy, the author argues that recent interpretations of nature's externality are not entirely successfully because they reconstruct nature by either looking back to logic or forward to spirit. Instead, the article offers an interpretation that starts off from Hegel's argument that nature is "weak" (ohnmächtig) as it is not, nor can become, thoroughly rational. It then traces the implications of this view in Hegel's inorganic philosophy of mechanics and physics. There, in a discussion that culminates with matter as fundamentally "brittle," a picture of externality emerges as the likelihood in nature of "deformed" or "damaged" determinations. What is ultimately unique about nature vis-à-vis logic is a setting in which partial rational determination makes sense at all.