Abstract
This chapter suggests that one can find a version of naturalism broad enough to be plausible to those initially attracted to non-naturalism if he/she uncovers what motivates naturalism and its denial. It describes the normative facts and normative properties. Non-naturalism is the view that normative properties cannot be seen as part of the scientific conception of the world, even in an ecumenical form. Two different pressures lead naturalism and non-naturalism away from one another. On the one hand, the naturalist wishes to anchor normative properties within the scientific conception of the world, and to avoid the attribution of properties which, by definition as non-natural, lie beyond that conception. On the other hand, the non-naturalist, noting the apparently highly significant difference between natural or descriptive properties and normative properties, marks that difference by isolating normativity from science.
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