Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Perception

Abstract

AbstractThis paper focuses on two debates: the Metaphysical debate over intentionalism and naïve realism, and the Psychological debate over constructivist and ecological theories. While these two debates are generally assumed to be orthogonal, it is difficult to specify the grounds for this assumption. The chapter considers the usual strategies for distinguishing between philosophical and scientific theories—such as appeals to modal strength, methodology, or explanatory features—and suggests that they do not apply in this case. It argues that both debates rely on inference to the best explanation to draw contingent conclusions about the constitutive nature of perceptual experience. The chapter also claims that the distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations will not separate the two debates unless we are already committed to the idea that the metaphysics of mind must be conducted at one particular level of explanation. It concludes that the two debates are engaged in the same general project concerning the nature of perception, and that the Psychological theories are no less metaphysical than the Metaphysical theories.