Natural Theology and the Uses of Argument

Abstract

Arguments in natural theology have recently increased in their number and level of sophistication. However, there has not been much analysis of the ways in which these arguments should be evaluated as good, taken collectively or individually. After providing an overview of some proposed goals and good-making criteria for arguments in natural theology, we provide an analysis that stands as a corrective to some of the illformed standards that are currently in circulation. Specifically, our analysis focuses on the relation between the veracity of the premises and their relation to the conclusion of an argument. In addition to providing a clearer account of what makes an argument good, an upshot of our account is that there remain positive contributions for “weak” arguments, especially within cumulative case arguments in ramified natural theology. The recent resurgence of natural theology has produced a wealth of arguments, deductive and inductive, for the existence of God. 1 The level of logical rigor in the development and analysis of these arguments has probably never been higher. But there has been relatively little attention paid to the question of what makes a deductive argument good, and the application of probabilistic analyses to ramified natural theology—the extension of the project of natural theology, which starts with public data, into the realm of historical argumentation to produce a case for the detailed claims of a particular religion—is still a relatively unexplored area. 2 In this paper, we explore some existing criteria of goodness for deductive arguments and develop some tools that permit a broader evaluation of the uses of argument in natural theology and elsewhere. In particular, we pay close attention to the question of the relation between the credibility of the premises of a deductively valid argument and the credibility of its conclusion and show that some claims made about the circumstances under which one ought to accept the conclusion of such an argument have been inaccurately formulated. We go on to suggest, however, that there are more uses for what one might term “weak” arguments than are generally appreciated, particularly in the context of a cumulative case argument for the existence of God. Finally, we show how a probabilistic model enables us to appreciate the contribution that each distinct line of evidence makes to such an argument. Some Goals of Theistic Arguments What should a good theistic argument do? This apparently simple question has elicited surprisingly diverse answers, and it is worth trying to clarify the question before we embark on any detailed analyses. 1 See Craig and Moreland, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2009); Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, 2d. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Rodney Holder, God, the Multiverse and Everything (Burlington, VA: Ashgate, 2004). 2 See Richard Swinburne, “Natural Theology, Its ‘Dwindling Probabilities’ and ‘Lack of Rapport,’” Faith and Philosophy 21 (2004), pp. 533-35.