Natural Selection and the Criteria by Which a Theory is Judged

Abstract

Brady, R. H. (Associate Professor of Philosophy, Ramapo College, Mahwah, New Jersey 07430) 1979. Natural selection and the criteria by which a theory is judged. Syst. Zool 28:600–621.—When recent literature on the falsifiability of natural selection is examined critics and defenders seem to communicate with each other very poorly. An examination the structure of tautology and that of causal explanation provides criteria by which to examine the claims of both critics and defenders. Natural selection is free of tautology in any formulation that recognizes the causal interaction between the organism and its environment, most recent critics have already understood this and are actually arguing that the theory not falsifiable in its operational form. Under examination, the operational forms of the concepts of adaptation and fitness turn out to be too indeterminate to be seriously tested, for they are protected by ad hoc additions drawn from an indeterminate realm. Future knowledge reduce the organism to a determinate system, but until such time too little is known investigate organism-environment relations. Researchers should consider whether natural selection is necessary to empiric investigation in their area, and whether it can serve purpose for which it is applied.