Natural Law and Common Law

Abstract

If you scan through the law reports ofthe last century or so, you will come across a sprinkling of references to Natural Law, commonly in conjunction with some such phrase as “manifest nonsense”.1 Introductory books dealing with the sources of law hardly place it in the forefront of their treatment, to say the least; and anyone writing a practitioners' manual on some practically useful area of law who began with a chapter on Natural Law would be thought to have taken leave of his senses. Go back two or three hundred years or so and the picture looks very different. References to the law of nature abound in the reports of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; institutional writers dealing with the Common Law will regularly list Natural Law as one of its principal sources, and when Stewart Kyd wrote the first English book on what we would now call company law2 the obvious starting pointfor his first chapter was the work of the Natural Lawyers of the previous century. England, like everywhere else in Europe, had been caught up in a fervour of Natural Law thinking. Legal historians, of course, are well aware of this, but commonly portray it in their books as part of the background against which the Common Law was worked out, rather than as an integral part ofthe story of English law's development.3 This downplaying of the practical significance of Natural Law represents something of a lost opportunity, not merely because it can give a frame of reference within which some sense can be made ofthe reorientation of English law in the eighteenth century, but also because it provides an important point ofcontact between the all-too-insular history ofEnglish law and the apparently more homogeneous legal history of the rest of Europe.