Natural Knowledge: An Analysis of Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology in Light of Contemporary Cognitive Science of Religion

Abstract

The foundation of Alvin Plantinga's reformed epistemology is the idea that beliefs which are naturally, non-inferentially and immediately produced by a cognitive faculty are properly basic. A properly basic belief is one that ought to be held as true, even if there is no evidence or argument to confirm it. Such a belief should only be rejected once sufficient evidence or a sound argument can be found to disprove it. Plantinga's most important claim is that belief in God is one such belief, produced by a cognitive faculty which he calls the sensus divinitatis. In this paper I will first examine three major accounts of the origin of religious beliefs from the cognitive science of religion, not only to show that such beliefs exist but also to see if any one of these accounts could be considered a scientific account of the sensus divinitatis. I will then examine reformed epistemology itself in order to find out whether or not Plantinga is correct in saying that these beliefs ought to be held as true until disproven and to see if Plantinga's properly basic beliefs can be considered a form of knowledge.