Abstract

The new externalist picture of natural kind terms due to Kripke, Putnam, and others has become quite popular in philosophy. Many philosophers of science have remained sceptical. Häggqvist and Wikforss have recently criticised this view severely. They contend it depends essentially on a micro-essentialist view of natural kinds that is widely rejected among philosophers of science, and that a scientifically reasonable metaphysics entails the resurrection of some version of descriptivism. It is argued in this paper that the situation is not quite as dark for the new theory of reference as many critics suggest. There are several distinct questions here which should not be conflated and ought to be dealt with one by one. Descriptivism remains arguably problematic.

Highlights

  • In the last few decades, the new externalist picture of natural kind terms due to Kripke, Putnam, and others has become quite popular in philosophy

  • Häggqvist and Wikforss have recently criticised this view severely. They contend it depends essentially on a micro-essentialist view of natural kinds that is widely rejected among philosophers of science, and that a scientifically reasonable metaphysics entails the resurrection of some version of descriptivism

  • I shall use their critical discussion as a baseline, and my principal aim is to clarify the whole area and what really is central to new theory of reference (NTR) and what is not, and to put forward certain positive ideas about natural kind terms and their meaning and reference

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Summary

Introduction

In the last few decades, the new externalist picture of natural kind terms due to Kripke, Putnam, and others has become quite popular in philosophy. This new theory of reference (NTR), as it is often called, has contested more traditional descriptivist and internalist views of meaning and reference, in particular in the case of proper names and natural kind terms. Sören Häggqvist and Åsa Wikforss ( H&W) severely criticise NTR as applied to natural kind terms.. Sören Häggqvist and Åsa Wikforss ( H&W) severely criticise NTR as applied to natural kind terms.1 They contend that it depends essentially on a view of natural kinds that is ‘widely rejected among philosophers of science’ The article by H&W is only the latest in a long series

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Theories of reference revisited
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Further developments of NTR
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Varieties of essentialism
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The resurrection of descriptivism?
A more sophisticated descriptivism?
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What of the common concept strategy?
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Some historical examples
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Conclusions
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