NATO's Lessons in Crisis

Abstract

In crisis management operations, strategic errors can cost lives. Some international organizations (IOs) learn from these failures, whereas, others tend to repeat them. Given high rates of turnover and shorter job contracts, how do IOs such as NATO retain any knowledge about past errors? Institutional memory enhances prospects for reforms that can prevent future failures. The book provides an explanation for how and why IOs develop institutional memory in international crisis management. Evidence indicates that the design of an IO’s learning infrastructure (e.g. lessons learned offices and databases) can inadvertently disincentivize IO elites from using it to share knowledge about strategic errors. Under such conditions, IO elites - high-level civilian and military officials - view reporting to be risky. In response, they prefer to contribute to institutional memory through the creation and use of informal processes such as transnational interpersonal networks, private documentation and conversations during crisis management exercises. The result is an institutional memory that remains vulnerable to turnover since critical knowledge is highly dependent on a handful of individuals. The book draws on the author’s interviews and a survey experiment with 120 NATO elites, including assistant secretary generals, military representatives and ambassadors. Cases of NATO crisis management in Afghanistan, Libya and Ukraine serve to further illustrate the development of institutional memory. Findings challenge existing organizational learning scholarship by indicating that formal learning processes alone are insufficient to ensure learning occurs. The book also offers policymakers a set of recommendations for strengthening the learning capacity of IOs.